

30 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Soviet Analysis, DDI
Chief, Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff, DDI
Chief, [REDACTED]
Chief, [REDACTED]

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Requirements

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1. I looked through the Inspector General's survey [REDACTED] on foreign intelligence collection requirements issued in 1966. [REDACTED] can write. Witness the guidelines he laid out for action on requirements for collection of information attached and marked Tab A.

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2. He did an exhausting review and a lot of what he recommended makes sense on the face of it. I imagine many of his recommendations have been implemented and that the system has changed over the years. I would like to be brought up to date on the current requirements system, how it is structured, how it functions, and how effective it is now judged to be. In Tab B is laid out the [REDACTED] judgment on the requirements then extant. I need to know current-day counterparts of the IPC List, the PNIOs, and the Current Intelligence Reporting List. Is the recommendation that the Collection Guidance Staff be directed to act on requests of DDS&T as well as DDI of any relevance today?

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3. What has been done to identify and make stand out the most important needs on the long list of requirements? [REDACTED] recommended that DDI and DDS&T be directed to prepare a preface identifying the most important needs in each issue of the CIRL. I was particularly interested in this recommendation on guidance of the [REDACTED] (See Tab C.) He also asked whether there were any requirements which [REDACTED] could fulfill but which are going instead to clandestine or technical collectors. The same question could be asked with respect to FDD and FBIS. Other suggestions are:

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-- In the field of political intelligence there is a special kind of relationship between the field case officer of the clandestine Services and the OCI analyst. Each is an expert in his own right, but they see the game from different seats in the ball park. The analyst views Clandestine Services reporting in the context of the spectrum of reporting from the State Department, the military attaches, FBIS, FDD, NSA, [REDACTED] The case officer on the scene

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
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may not see many of these reports, but he is immersed in the culture and can form his own valid opinions. Continuous communication between these two experts of different viewpoints is more effective than the sterile transmission of formal requirements.

-- The respect earned by the opinions of field officers, as distinct from hard intelligence reporting, is exemplified by the [redacted] institution which provides for periodic situation reports from the field. We believe that a reverse [redacted] system, in which DCI would elucidate the Washington community point of view for the benefit of individual field stations, would guide some current collection efforts better than formal requirements. We also believe that field stations would welcome such guidance, especially in rapidly developing or changing situations in which the chief of station must make quick choices in using his assets.

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4. I want a look at the present state of our collection requirements and how we can improve both targeting and focusing of our HUMINT collection assets. I suggest that John McMahon involve the addressees of this memorandum in this process and I would like to participate in a meeting in which I can be briefed on where all this stands and where the potential is at the earliest opportunity which can usefully be arranged.


William J. Casey

Attachments--

Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001100040004-1

Define what we, as an Agency, believe the Government needs from the intelligence community.

Challenge the community's and our own past assumptions as to what is needed.

Identify the most important gaps that can be realistically stated in terms of collection requirements and production goals.

Arrange these gaps in terms of collection and production priorities.

Reduce the volume of requirements in order to gain more effective collection and production action. ✓

Train the analysts to write fewer and better requirements.

Discriminate between the important and the trivial.

Adjust requirements on the several collection systems so that they complement and support each other.

Record requirements that are levied orally. ✓

Do not allow collection requirements to exceed the capabilities of the processors and the analysts.

Make validation and coordination of requirements systematic.

Review outstanding requirements periodically. ✓

Improve feedback from collectors to analysts and vice versa.

Systematize operational support. 3.

Analyze the problem thoroughly--in terms of needs, priorities, and capabilities for processing and analysis--before committing the Agency to a new collection effort.

Improve guidance by evaluating what has already been collected.

Stop trying to cover the whole world comprehensively and superficially.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR	X			
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EED				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	D/SOVA/DBI		X		
21	C/CRES/DBI		X		
22			X		
23					

Remarks: 24 ES

D/ Executive Secretary
30 Mar 82

Date

DR's note attached
only to 21, 22, &
23 copies as well
as 3, 24, & 25X1
OK.

1. CIA is collecting too much information--more than it can use properly, probably far more than the Government needs. Like the rest of the intelligence community it makes up for not collecting enough of the right kind of information on the most important targets by flooding the system with secondary matter.
2. The quantity of information is degrading the quality of our finished intelligence.
4. We find that these excesses are a direct consequence of our several independent requirements systems, whose defects have these principal causes:
 - a. No one has ever defined what the Government truly needs from the intelligence community, either as to fundamental requirements for U.S. policy or as to what can be put to best use by the producers and readers of finished intelligence. The closest thing to a definition has been the Priority National Intelligence Objectives, a lamentably defective document which amounts to a ritual justification of every kind of activity anybody believes to be desirable. The community and CIA make their own assumptions as to what is needed, and then do not challenge these assumptions sufficiently.
 - b. CIA's requirements for collection of information are a catalogue of all the subjects individual consumers all over the community have said they would like to know about. They are an indiscriminated mixture of crucial and trivial, appropriate and irrelevant, and are altogether too numerous for effective action, either of collection or of production.
 - c. Management at all levels has allowed this proliferation of requirements to go almost wholly unchecked.
 - d. Resources for collection, especially technical collection, greatly outweigh resources for production.
 - e. There is too little useful communication between originators of requirements and those whose function it is to satisfy them.
 - f. The community has just begun to rationalize requirements, collection, and production as between various systems.

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